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Problem and Aim
Question: Does respect really trigger public justification?
Hypothesis: There is a gap between respect and public 
justification; public reason theories rely on a misunderstanding 
about the concept of justification
Aim: To understand how respect and justification should be 
conceptualized among citizens living in a democratic society
Relevance: If respect does not trigger public justification, we may 
need something different to tackle the problem of disagreement 
in democratic societies
Outline
1) Rawls’s and Gaus’s arguments for PJ and their 
problems
2) A misunderstanding about justification
3) A different conception of respect
4) The possibility of moral compromises 
Rawls’s argument
How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just 
society of free and equal citizens divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?
Rawls’s aim: to find a political conception of justice apt to secure 
an overlapping consensus among reasonable citizens
Given the the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
 Political power must be used in ways that all citizens may 
reasonably be expected to endorse (Principle of Legitimacy)
 Duty of civility: citizens need to employ public reasons
 Principle of respect to free and equal persons
Gaus’s argument
Gaus aims at securing a social morality, a set of rules apt to organize how individuals 
are to make moral demands over each other
Gaus’s problem is to neutralize the possibility of authoritarianism, the imposition of 
normative standards on those who may not have sufficient reason to endorse them > 
Convergence Model of Public Justification
Respect for persons grounds the principle of public justification. 
(1) Moral persons enjoy the status of free and equal.
(2) Moral persons are all equally authoritative (though not equally good) interpreters 
of the demands of morality. 
(3) Accordingly, one cannot appeal to the authority of her own private judgment over 
those of others in issuing moral demands. 
(4) Individuals need to acknowledge a fundamental constrain on the justification of 
claims to moral authority over. 
(5) A social morality cannot be authoritarian and needs to be publicly justified in 
order to respect moral persons as free and equal. 
Problems with PRL
 Rawls and Gaus seem to rely on the intuitive power for the claim that 
respect requires public justification. Since there are different conceptions 
of respect (Hampton 1989; Eberle 2002; Stout 2004; Weithman 2004), an 
argument showing that their idea is the correct one is needed
 Should not respect be grounded in some general considerations that 
everyone shares and not only granted to qualified persons (for example, 
the reasonable ones…)?
 Isn’t it disrespectful and authoritarian?
Cashing in some form of idealization (even mild) cannot help run against PRL’s 
own commitment and premise: if each person should not be subjected or 
coerced on the basis of rules she does not have sufficient reason to endorse, 
then idealization brings disrespect into the picture
A misunderstanding
The point if PRL is that there is something deeply wrong about 
subjecting another on the basis that one believes certain things
> This cannot help to seem correct!
However, is this what is going on between two individuals 
rejecting public justification who happen to disagree on a certain 
matter of public interest?
Misunderstanding: demanding another to comply because one 
believes so /demanding one to comply because circumstances are 
such that the other should comply (Raz 1998; Enoch 2013)
Unfolding the misunderstanding
Bill and Jill disagree about vegetarianism. Bill defends the idea that 
killing animals for alimentary purposes should be outlaw, whereas Jill 
disagrees.
(1) Bill does not condemn animals’ killing on the basis that he believes 
so 
(2) Bill condemns animals’ killing because it is wrong, as he believes
> Bill is not a moralist, who self-appoints validity to his own thinking. Is 
he being disrespectful or authoritarian?
Since there is nothing wrong about issuing a certain demand on the 
basis that it is the case, not to abide by the rules of public justification is 
not by itself disrespectful. 
A different kind of liberalism and 
respect
• Coercion needs to be justified
• Political justification is a practice of reason giving 
• Rational justification, not public justification
• Respect is owed to persons qua rational persons, able to employ 
their cognitive resources to determine whether some law or 
principle is morally appropriate:
1. It is a form of recognition respect
2. Being respectful means to observe certain restrictions
3. It requires to reach and offer the best possible reasons
A moral duty to seek agreement
Respect requires to provide others with the best reasons we have 
Given that we are after rational justification, we are looking for right 
answers to political problems

The notion of respect implies a duty to seek agreement on the right 
answer
But what does happen in the face of disagreement, when no one has a 
conclusive argument for her favourite political option? 
> The case of abortion
Moral compromises for pragmatic 
solutions
When it comes to political justification, irreconcilable claims must be 
somehow resolved: political inaction is not without consequences and 
conflict is undesirable > Compromise solution to disagreement
Compromise ≠ correction or rectiﬁcation
Moral compromise ≠ strategic compromise
Given the principle of respect for persons as rational persons, one 
needs to recognize other’s capacity to interpret problems

Moral compromise > provide an equilibrium on a certain position based 
on moral reasons
> Moral compromises arise in the context of genuine disagreement and 
are grounded in the moral principle of respect
A mere modus vivendi?
Modus Vivendi
• It is based on interests and 
power
• It can be found without 
deliberation
• Shifts when interests and 
balance of powers change
• Moral costs are irrelevant
Moral compromise
• It is based on moral reasons
• It is the result of a process of 
reason-giving
• Shift when new evidence 
and new ideas enter the 
process of justification
• Moral costs are evident
Conclusions
• I showed that public reason liberals have a problem 
with the relation between respect and public 
justification
• I proposed a different understanding of the notion of 
respect and justification
• I showed that rejecting public reason liberalism does 
not necessarily turn into embracing a modus vivendi
• I attempted to argue that we may have moral reasons 
(stemming from the notion of respect) to compromise 
on certain issues
